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SUPERFICIALLY NEUTRAL CLASSIFICATIONS:
EXTENDING DISPARATE IMPACT THEORY
TO INDIVIDUALS
D. DON WELCHt
In Connecticut v. Teal the United States Supreme Court broke the
conceptual barrier between the disparate impact and disparate treat-
ment theories of employment discrimination. Although previous deci-
sions had limited application of the disparate impact theory to cases
involving the effect of an employment practice on a protected group, the
Teal Court emphasized that the theory can be used to remedy individual
claims of discrimination and also to eliminate employment practices
that limit the employment access and opportunities of a protected indi-
vidual Subsequent lower court decisions have encountered great diffi-
culty applying this theoretical realignment. Dean Welch attempts to end
this confusion by developing a new framework for applying the disparate
impact theory to individual claims of discrimination. He first proposes
that courts recognize a category of "superficially neutral" employment
practices-practices that consistently have an adverse impact on groups
protected by Title VII. An individual plaintiff then could make a prima
facie disparate impact case by demonstrating the loss of an employment
opportunity because of one of these "superficially neutral" practices.
This framework would create a mechanism for fulfilling the mandate in
Teal that the benefits of the disparate impact theory be extended to the
individual.
Cases interpreting and enforcing Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19641
have proceeded along two widely recognized theories of employment discrimina-
tion: disparate treatment and disparate impact. The first theory, disparate treat-
ment, has been characterized as focusing on a concern for fairness to the
individual; the second theory, disparate impact, has been treated as dealing with
the effect of employment practices on groups.2 Each theory has its own authori-
tative statement in a venerable Supreme Court decision--McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green3 and Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,4 respectively-and each has de-
veloped through the distinctive progeny of these landmark cases.
On June 12, 1982, the Supreme Court breached this theoretical barrier in its
t Assistant Dean and Lecturer, Vanderbilt Law School. B.A. 1969, Baylor University; M.A.
1975, Ph.D. 1976, Vanderbilt University. The author wishes to thank Professors Robert Belton and
Robert N. Covington for their useful suggestions and comments, and to acknowledge the contribu-
tion of Joseph Hinchliffe, who served as his research assistant.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-3 to -17 (1982).
2. See, e.g., Belton, Discrimination and Affirmative Action: An Analysis of Competing Theories
of Equality and Weber, 59 N.C.L. REv. 531, 542-68 (1981).
3. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
4. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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decision in Connecticut v. Teal.5 One aspect of the Teal decision-that an em-
ployer's "bottom line"6 does not provide immunity from liability for the dis-
criminatory impact of particular employment practices-has been the subject of
extensive commentary 7 and has been followed by lower courts. 8 This Article
does not address that issue, but rather examines two other aspects of the decision
that potentially reach further: the need for courts that are adjudicating dispa-
rate impact cases to focus on employment opportunities rather than results and
the need to consider the effects of employment practices on individuals rather
than groups.
The majority opinion in Teal recasts employment discrimination theory in a
manner that both mandates a new approach to disparate impact analysis and
holds promise for the development of a unitary theory of employment discrimi-
nation. Except for a few suggestive references, pursuit of the Teal promise of a
single analytic approach is beyond the scope of this Article. The Article, how-
ever, will demonstrate that the Teal Court moved significantly away from the
traditional dual analytic framework that has guided the development of employ-
ment discrimination law for more than a decade. The Article also will show that
the reasoning in Teal can be incorporated into future adjudication of certain
disparate impact claims only through the formulation of a new analytic
framework.
Part I of the Article briefly discusses the disparate impact and disparate
treatment theories. Over time, these approaches so frequently have been de-
scribed by commentators and confirmed by the Court that the recitation of their
component parts has become an almost mindless routine. Part II recounts the
disruption of this routine by the Teal Court. Although the Court could have
decided the case according to the traditional disparate impact model, the Teal
5. 457 U.S. 440 (1982).
6. The "bottom line" concept refers to the overall result of an employment policy or practice.
A bottom-line analysis measures the ultimate consequences of the employer's hiring or other person-
nel practices taken as a whole. The test is whether there is a nondiscriminatory balance in the group
of persons actually hired or promoted.
7. See, e-g., Blumrosen, The "Bottom Line" after Connecticut v. Teal, 8 EMPL. REL. LJ. 572
(1983); Chamallas, Evolving Conceptions of Equality under Title VIL: Disparate Impact Theory and
the Demise of the Bottom Line Principle, 31 UCLA L. Rav. 305 (1983); Thompson & Christiansen,
Court Acceptance of Uniform Guidelines Provisions: The Bottom Line and the Search forAlternatives,
8 EMPL. REL. L.J.. 587 (1983); Note, The Bottom Line Concept in Title V1lLitigation: Connecticut
v. Teal and the Relevance of End Results, 15 CONN. L. REV. 821 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Note,
The Bottom Line Concept]; Note, The Bottom Line Defense in Title VfII Actions: Supreme Court
Rejection in Connecticut v. Teal and a Modified Approach, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 735 (1983); Note,
Erasing the "Bottom Line". Connecticut v. Teal, 6 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 175 (1983); Note, An
Interpretation of the Bottom Line Defense-Statutory Interpretation Versus Theoretical Purity-Con-
necticut v. Teal, 27 How. L.J. 681 (1984); Note, The 'Bottom Line" Defense in Disparate Impact
Cases: Connecticut v. Teal, 6 U. ARK. LrrrLE ROCK L.J. 475 (1983); Note, Connecticut v. Teal:
Extending Griggs Beyond the Bottom Line, 44 U. Prrr. L. REv. 751 (1983); Note, The Supreme
Court Looks at the 'Bottom Line"-Conneticut v. Teal, 5 W. NEw ENG. L. REv. 785 (1983) [here-
inafter cited as Note, The Supreme Court].
8. See, eg., Walls v. Mississippi State Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 730 F.2d 306 (5th Cir. 1984);
Howard v. Roadway Express, Inc., 726 F.2d 1529 (11th Cir. 1984); Williams v. Vukovich, 720 F.2d
909 (6th Cir. 1983); Bell v. Bolger, 708 F.2d 1312 (8th Cir. 1983); Carpenter v. Stephen F. Austin
State Univ., 706 F.2d 608 (5th Cir. 1983); Leftwich v. Harris-Stowe State College, 702 F.2d 686 (8th
Cir. 1983); Peters v. Lieuallen, 693 F.2d 966 (9th Cir. 1982).
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majority took the occasion to scrutinize the reasoning with which the legal com-
munity had become so comfortable. The result was an opinion that focused on
the individual rather than the group in a disparate impact setting and that found
a statutory basis for emphasizing the employment process rather than the
outcome.
The task after Teal is to articulate a conceptual framework that will make
the Court's findings available for use in similar disparate impact cases. The
proposition advanced in Part III is that Teal suggests a two-stage analysis that
makes disparate impact theory available to individual plaintiffs. This new ap-
proach, incorporating a newly defined category of "superficially neutral" classifi-
cations, preserves established legislative and judicial understandings while
making use of the emphasis in Teal that disparate impact cases should focus on
the employment opportunities for individuals rather than on results for groups.
I. DISPARATE IMPACT AND DISPARATE TREATMENT THEORIES
The Title VII provisions that establish employment discrimination liability
are sections 703(a)(1) and 703(a)(2), which state:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to
his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants
for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to de-
prive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individ-
ual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.9
The courts consistently have held that section 703(a) provides a statutory
foundation for two distinct theories of employment discrimination: disparate
treatment and disparate impact.10 The Supreme Court summarized the differ-
ences between the two theories in International Brotherhood of Teamsters v.
United States.11
"Disparate treatment".., is the most easily understood type of
discrimination. The employer simply treats some people less favorably
than others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national ori-
gin. Proof of discriminatory motive is critical, although it can in some
situations be inferred from the mere fact of differences in treatment.
Claims of disparate treatment may be distinguished from claims
9. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982).
10. These theories have been described in a similar fashion by dozens of commentators and
observers. See, eg., B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAw 1-12 (2d ed.
1983); Belton, supra note 2, at 538-60; Chamallas, supra note 7, at 314-23; Fiss, A Theory of Fair
Employment Laws, 38 U. CHI. L. REv. 235, 237-49 (1971).
11. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
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that stress "disparate impact." The latter involve employment prac-
tices that are facially neutral in their treatment of different groups but
that in fact fall more harshly on one group than another and cannot be
justified by business necessity. . . . Proof of discriminatory motive,
we have held, is not required under a disparate-impact theory. 12
As these theories have developed, disparate treatment has focused on fair
treatment for individuals, whereas disparate impact is concerned with fairness
for groups. 13 Further, while disparate impact claims can be established by evi-
dence of the effects of an employment practice on a protected group, a finding of
liability under the disparate treatment theory requires a showing of intentional
discrimination in the employment process.14
The essence of a disparate impact claim is the use of an employment prac-
tice to control employment opportunity when the use of that practice adversely
and disproportionately affects the employment opportunities of a group pro-
tected by the statute. Thus, in Griggs, the landmark case on the disparate im-
pact theory, the Court found minimum education and test requirements to be
violations of Title VII. The Court noted that neither requirement was shown to
be "significantly related to job performance," both requirements operated to
disqualify blacks from transfer and promotion at a "significantly higher rate"
than whites, and the employer had a history of pre-Title VII discrimination.15
The Court in Griggs held that "[g]ood intent or the absence of discrimina-
tory intent does not redeem employment procedures. . . that operate as 'built-
in head winds' for minority groups and that are unrelated to measuring job ca-
pacity." 16 The Court reasoned that Congress, by enacting Title VII, intended to
achieve equality of employment opportunity and not merely to punish discrimi-
natory motivation.1 7 Thus, for disparate impact cases proof of discriminatory
intent is unnecessary. The Act was intended to remove "artificial, arbitrary, and
unnecessary barriers to employment"; an employment practice that is fair in
form but discriminatory in effect is prohibited unless the practice is a "business
necessity."'18 The job requirements at issue in Griggs were prohibited because
they were not shown to be job related or mandated by business necessity.
In Abermarle Paper Co. v. Moody19 the Court affirmed the Griggs standard
for a prima facie case---disproportionate adverse impact on a protected group-
and delineated the essence of the business necessity/job-relatedness defense. The
Moody decision granted "great deference" to the Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Commission guidelines in defining job relatedness:
The message of these Guidelines is the same as that of the Griggs
12. Id. at 335-36 n.15.
13. Belton, supra note 2, at 558; Chamallas, supra note 7, at 316-17.
14. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-56 (1981); Furnco
Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978); McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 805.
15. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 426.
16. Id. at 432.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 431.
19. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
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case-that discriminatory tests are impermissible unless shown, by
professionally acceptable methods, to be "predictive of or significantly
correlated with important elements of work behavior which comprise
or are relevant to the job or jobs for which candidates are being
evaluated."
'20
The Court also identified a "pretext" inquiry in Moody, stating that even if
defendants demonstrate that tests are job related, plaintiffs still should be given
an opportunity to present evidence that the use of these tests is a pretext for
discrimination, given alternative selection procedures available to the com-
pany.21 The Teal court affirmed the standard formulation of the Moody three-,
part analysis of a disparate impact claim:
To establish a prima facie case of discrimination, a plaintiff must show
that the facially neutral employment practice had a significantly dis-
criminatory impact. If that showing is made, the employer must then
demonstrate that "any given requirement [has] a manifest relationship
to the employment in question," in order to avoid a finding of discrimi-
nation. . . .Even in such a case, however, the plaintiff may prevail, if
he shows that the employer was using the practice as a mere pretext
for discrimination.
22
Disparate impact theory has been linked to section 703(a)(2) since Griggs.
23
The language of section 703(a)(2) prohibits employment practices that "deprive
or tend to deprive" an individual of an employment opportunity.24 The Court
affirmed that section 703(a)(2) was the statutory basis for the disparate impact
theory in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert,25 distinguishing such a claim from that
appropriate to a disparate treatment analysis under section 703(a)(1).
The disparate treatment approach covers acts that constitute purposeful
discrimination by an employer. This theory addresses intentional, unequal treat-
ment of particular individuals and also calls for a three-stage analysis. In Mc-
Donnell Douglas the Supreme Court specified the elements of a prima facie case
for employment discrimination; 26 the court cautioned, however, that the facts
will vary from one Title VII case to another and that the prima facie proof
required in this particular case was not necessarily applicable in every respect to
20. Id. at 431 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(c) (1974)).
21. Id. at 436.
22. Teal, 457 U.S. at 446-47 (quoting Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432).
23. See Belton, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: A Decade of Private Enforcement and
Judicial Developments, 20 ST. Louis U.L.J. 225 (1976); Blumrosen, Stranger in Paradise: Griggs v.
Duke Power Co. and The Concept of Employment Discrimination, 71 MICH. L. REV. 59 (1972).
24. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (1982).
25. 429 U.S. 125, 137 (1976).
26. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. The McDonnell Douglas prima facie case showing
required (1) membership in a protected class, (2) application and qualification for an employment
opportunity, (3) rejection of the application, and (4) continued availability of the opportunity to
others. Id. In later cases the Supreme Court explained that these elements were sufficent to establish
a prima facie case because of the presumption that the acts in question were based on some motivat-
ing reason and that if all legitimate reasons for the acts have been eliminated, it is likely that the
employer based its decision on an impermissible consideration such as race. See Texas Dep't of
Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253-54 (1981); Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438
U.S. 567, 577 (1978).
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differing factual situations. 27 In the McDonnell Douglas context, a presumption
of discrimination arises if a plaintiff is a member of a protected group and quali-
fied for a given job, yet is not hired by an employer for an admitted vacancy. 28
If a plaintiff proves a prima facie case, the employer must "articulate" 29 a
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its conduct, 30 although the employer
also remains free to attack the plaintiff's prima facie case. If an employer in-
troduces a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason into evidence, the plaintiff may
challenge the employer's evidence on its intent by demonstrating that the reason
given was a "pretext" for intentional discrimination or that it was applied in a
discriminatory manner.
3 1
The emphasis on individuals in disparate treatment cases is clear in the
Supreme Court decisions on section 703(a)(1) claims that followed McDonnell
Douglas. The Court has highlighted the fact that section 703(a)(1) prohibits
discriminatory treatment of "any individual"; 32 it noted in Furnco Construction
Corp. v Waters33 that Title VII imposes an obligation "to provide an equal op-
portunity for each applicant regardless of race, without regard to whether mem-
bers of the applicant's race are already proportionately represented in the work
force."'34 The Supreme Court's clearest statement on the priority of individual
claims, as opposed to group considerations, appears in Los Angeles Department
of Water & Power v. Manhart.35 Dealing with a generalization about men and
women that was accepted as "unquestionably true"-that women, as a class, live
longer than men-the Court stated that section 703(a)(1) "precludes treatment
of individuals as simply components of a racial, religious, sexual or national
class. . . . [T]he basic policy of the statute requires that we focus on fairness to
individuals rather than fairness to classes."
' 3 6
In summary, the focus of the disparate treatment theory has been on the
way an individual has been treated, while disparate impact theory has focused
on protected groups.37 The former has emphasized fair treatment in the em-
ployment process for each individual involved, while the latter has been con-
cerned with results and the outcome of employment policies and practices for
specified groups.
27. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 n.13.
28. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253-54 n.6 (1981).
29. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
30. Id. The Burdine Court clarified the meaning of the "articulation" standard. The burden on
the defendant is to produce evidence that the decision was made "for a legitimate nondiscriminatory
reason." Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981). "[T]he defendant
must clearly set forth, through the production of admissible evidence, the reasons for the plaintiff's
rejection." Id. at 255. "An articulation not admitted into evidence will not suffice. Thus, the de-
fendant cannot meet its burden merely through an answer to the complaint or by argument of coun-
sel." Id. at 255 n.9.
31. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981); McDonnell Doug-
las, 411 U.S. at 804-05.
32. MacDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 280 (1976).
33. 438 U.S. 567 (1978).
34. Id. at 579.
35. 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
36. Id. at 708-09.
37. Furnco, 438 U.S. at 581-82 (Marshall, J., concurring in part).
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II. CONNECTICUT v TEAL
A. A Disparate Impact Decision
In Teal four black employees of the Connecticut Department of Income
Maintenance were promoted provisionally to the position of welfare eligibility
supervisor and served in that capacity for almost two years. To obtain perma-
nent status as supervisors these employees had to participate in a selection pro-
cess that required as a first step a passing score on a written examination. This
exam was administered to 329 candidates, 48 of whom identified themselves as
black and 259 as white.3 8 The passing rate on the exam for the black candidates
was 54.17%, approximately 68% of the passing rate for white candidates.
39
The four employees were among the blacks who failed the examination; thus,
they were excluded from further consideration for permanent supervisory
positions.4°
These employees brought an action alleging that the State of Connecticut,
two state agencies, and two state officials had violated Title VII by requiring, as
an absolute condition of consideration for promotion, that applicants pass a
written test which disproportionately excluded blacks and was not job related.
Promotions were made from the eligibility list generated by the written test. In
choosing persons from that list, the Department considered past work perform-
ance, recommendations of the candidates' supervisors, and to a lesser extent,
seniority. Forty-six persons were promoted to permanent supervisory positions,
eleven of whom were black and thirty-five of whom were white.4 1 Thus, the
overall result of the selection process was that 22.95% of the identified black
candidates in the selection process were promoted while only 13.5% of the iden-
tified white candidates were promoted.42 The State urged that this "bottom-
line" result, more favorable to blacks than to whites, should be considered a
complete defense to the suit.
43
The district court held that while the comparative passing rates for the ex-
amination indicated adverse impact, the result of the entire hiring process did
not. Consequently, the court concluded that these bottom-line percentages pre-
cluded the finding of a Title VII violation and that the employer was not re-
quired to demonstrate that the promotional examination was job related. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, 44 holding that
the district court had erred in ruling that the results of the written examination
alone were insufficient to support a prima facie case of disparate impact.45 The
Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' decision, ruling that a nondiscrim-
inatory bottom-line neither precluded the establishment of a prima facie case nor
38. Teal, 457 U.S. at 443.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 443-44.
41. Id. at 444.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Connecticut v. Teal, 645 F.2d 133 (2d Cir. 1981), aff'd, 457 U.S. 440 (1982).
45. Id. at 134-35.
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provided a defense to such a case.
46
The issue in Connecticut v. Teal was whether the use of the test adminis-
tered by the state agency violated section 703(a)(2), which prohibits the limita-
tion, segregation, or classification of employees in a manner that deprives, or
tends to deprive, any individual of an employment opportunity because of his or
her race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 47 The facts conformed to the
disparate impact model that the Court had developed in Griggs, Moody, and
Dothard v. Rawlinson.
48
Teal presented no contest when viewed simply as raising two questions.
First, did the test exclude blacks disproportionately from the promotion pro-
46. Teal, 457 U.S. at 452. This ruling came as a considerable blow to those who had accepted
the growing consensus in the lower courts and legal literature on the meaning of the bottom-line
concept. The Court's decision, however, was not contrary to any of its earlier findings and, in fact,
simply filled a void that often had been overlooked.
The bottom-line theory gained prominence when it was included in the Uniform Guidelines on
Employee Selection Procedures in 1978.
If. . . the total selection process does not have an adverse impact, the Federal enforce-
ment agencies, in the exercise of their administrative and prosecutorial discretion, in usual
circumstances, will not expect a user to evaluate the individual components for adverse
impact, or to validate such individual components, and will not take enforcement action
based upon adverse impact of any component of that process.
29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(C) (1984). This language led to some assumptions about the use of the bottom-
line concept in the law. Alfred W. Blumrosen stated a widely held perspective when he wrote:
"This principle means that the law will 'let alone' those employers whose practices produce an ac-
ceptable number of minorities and women in various job categories." Blumrosen, The Bottom Line
Concept in Equal Employment Opportunity Law, 12 N.C. CEr. L.J. 1, 4 (1980) [hereinafter cited as
Blumrosen, The Bottom Line Concept]. Professor Blumrosen further wrote: "Once the bottom line
is 'satisfied' employers should be free to operate personnel systems on principles which do not take
into account race or sex." Id. at 20.
As Teal makes clear, these are only agency guidelines. Writing later on the history of the
Uniform Guidelines (now issued jointly by the EEOC, the Civil Service Commission, the Depart-
ment of Labor, and the Department of Justice), Blumrosen recalled that the phrase "in the exercise
of their administrative and prosecutorial discretion" was put into the guidelines to ensure that this
section was understood as an exercise of discretion, not agency interpretation of the law. "It was
meant to prevent the courts from treating this section of the Guidelines as the Commission's inter-
pretation of the Statute." Blumnrosen, The Bottom Line in Equal Employment Guidelines Adminis-
tering a Polycentric Problem, 33 AD. L. REv. 323, 335 n.32 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Blumrosen,
Polycentric Problem].
These distinctions perhaps were best preserved in a 1978 overview of the Guidelines written by
Bluimrosen, which were known at the time as the "English version."
Employers have argued that as long as their "bottom-line" shows no overall adverse
impact, there is no violation at all, regardless of the operation of a particular component of
the process.
Employee representatives have argued that rights under equal employment opportu-
nity laws are individual and the fact that an employer has hired some minorities does not
justify discrimination against other minorities. Therefore, they argue that adverse impact
is to be determined by examination of each component of the selecting procedure, regard-
less of the "bottom-line." This question has not been answered definitively by the courts.
There are decisions pointing in both directions.
These Guidelines do not address the underlying question of the law. They discuss
only the exercise of prosecutorial discretion by the Government agencies themelves. . ..
The individual retains the right to proceed through the appropriate agencies, and into
Federal court ....
43 Fed. Reg. 38290, 38291 (1978). The Teal Court answered this question definitively. See Teal,
457 U.S. at 456.
47. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (1982).
48. 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
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cess? The answer to this question was yes under the traditional Griggs disparate
impact analysis. That fact was not in dispute. Second, was the test job related?
The answer was no. No attempt was made to demonstrate any relationship be-
tween the test and the supervisory positions. A violation of Title VII was clearly
established.
Defendants contended that the bottom line-the final result of the promo-
tion process-was not discriminatory. Blacks indeed were promoted at a higher
rate in the final accounting. 49 Consequently, Justice Powell, in a dissent joined
by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor, argued that "our
disparate impact cases consistently have considered whether the result of an em-
ployer's total selection process had an adverse impact upon the protected
group."50 Because the total selection process did not have an adverse impact on
blacks, Justice Powell found in favor of the State of Connecticut.51
A fundamental point that divided the Teal Court was whether the Court's
previous disparate impact decisions had focused on the total selection process.
Justice Brennan, the author of the majority opinion, answered this question in
the negative: "This Court has never read § 703(a)(2) as requiring the focus to be
placed instead on the overall number of minority or female applicants actually
hired or promoted." 52 The Supreme Court never had dealt explicitly with the
adverse impact by one element of a hiring or promoting process when this im-
49. See supra text accompanying note 42.
50. Teal, 457 U.S. at 458 (Powell, J., dissenting).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 450. One commentator has claimed that the Teal Court overlooked prior bottom-line
decisions. Rigler, Connecticut v. Teal: The Supreme Court's Latest Exposition of Disparate Impact
Analysis, 59 NoTRE DAME L. Rnv. 313 (1984). Although most of these prior decisions were dis-
cussed in the Teal opinions, neither the majority nor the dissent cited Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co.,
414 U.S. 86 (1973). In that case, plaintiff challenged a citizenship requirement for employment on
the ground that it constituted discrimination based on national origin. The Court rejected the claim,
not because of the company's acceptable overall bottom line, as is argued by Blumrosen, see Blum-
rosen, The Bottom Line Concept, supra note 46, at 8, but because the concept of "national origin" did
not embrace citizenship. "Nothing in the Act makes it illegal to discriminate on the basis of citizen-
ship or alienage." Espinoza, 414 U.S. at 95. Furthermore, the Court treated Espinoza basically as a
disparate treatment case. The bottom-line figures-that 97% of those who worked at Farah in the
job for which Mr. Espinoza applied were of Mexican ancestry-were cited by the Court in a treat-
ment context.
While statistics such as these do not automatically shield an employer from a charge of
unlawful discrimination, the plain fact of the matter is that Farah does not discriminate
against persons of Mexican national origin with respect to employment in the job Ms.
Espinoza sought. She was denied employment, not because of the country of her origin,
but because she had not yet achieved United States citizenship. In fact, the record shows
that the worker hired in the place of Ms. Espinoza was a citizen with a Spanish surname.
Id. at 93. Plaintiff could not establish a prima facie case using a disparate treatment analysis.
Farah's act was based not on an intent to exclude persons of Mexican ancestry, but an intent to
exclude noncitizens. Under Title VII, citizenship does not constitute a protected category. Further,
since a person of Mexican-American ancestry was hired, plaintiff could not establish a prima facie
case following the McDonnell Douglas inference-of-discrimination formula.
Following Teal, however, the Court might give a different judgment if a similar case were
presented as a disparate impact case. If it could be demonstrated that this component of the hiring
process had an adverse impact on Mexican-Americans regardless of the bottom line, the Court could
not repeat its finding in Espinoza that "[t]here is no indication in the record that Farah's policy
against employment of aliens had the purpose or effect of discriminating against persons of Mexican
national origin." Id. at 92 (emphasis added).
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pact did not exist at the bottom line as well. Thus, there was no direct precedent
in support of either the majority opinion or the dissent.
Nonetheless, some language used by the Court in prior disparate impact
cases-even though these cases had involved employment practices with a dis-
criminatory bottom line-supported the majority opinion. The Teal Court
quoted the following language from Griggs: "'If an employment practice which
operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job performance,
the practice is prohibited.' -53 If there is some ambiguity whether "an employ-
ment practice" refers to a single test or to the total process, that ambiguity ap-
peared to have been resolved a few paragraphs later: "Congress has placed on
the employer the burden of showing that any given requirement must have a
manifest relationship to the employment in question."'54 Dothard also was clear
on this point: "The plaintiffs in a case such as this are not required to exhaust
every possible source of evidence, if the evidence actually presented on its face
conspicuously demonstrates a job requirement's grossly discriminatory im-
pact."55 Therefore, Teal is consistent with the previously espoused view that
section 703(a)(2) applies to a single test or requirement, as well as the total pro-
cess. Indeed, even Justice Powell lapsed into this language in his dissent: "Such
[disparate impact] claims necessarily are based on whether the group fares less
well than other groups under a policy, practice, or test."
56
The Court could have based its ruling on this traditional disparate impact
analysis, varying from the bottom-line approach only by insisting that disparate
impact must be gauged for each component of a selection process and not simply
for the process as a whole.57 The majority opinion, however, ranged far beyond
this narrow basis. Apparently confronted with circumstances that revealed in-
adequacies in the way employment discrimination theory had been formulated,
the Court broke new ground, pointing the way toward the development of a
more adequate approach to this problem.
B. Process as Well as Outcomes
The Supreme Court's rejection of the bottom-line defense signaled that the
outcome of a decisionmaking process could not be considered apart from an
analysis of the components of that process.
The suggestion that disparate impact should be measured only at the
bottom line ignores the fact that Title VII guarantees these individual
respondents the opportunity to compete equally with white workers on
the basis of job-related criteria. Title VII strives to achieve equality of
opportunity by rooting out "artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary" em-
ployer-created barriers to professional development that have a dis-
criminatory impact upon individuals. Therefore, respondents' rights
53. Teal, 457 U.S. at 446 (quoting Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431).
54. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432 (emphasis added).
55. Dothard, 433 U.S. at 331 (emphasis added).
56. Teal, 457 U.S. at 462 (Powell, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
57. This interpretation of Teal can be found in Note, The Supreme Court, supra note 7.
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under § 703(a)(2) have been violated, unless petitioners can demon-
strate that the examination given was not an artificial, arbitrary, or
unnecessary barrier, because it measured skills related to effective per-
formance in the role of Welfare Eligibility Supervisor.
58
If the Court had spoken only about the need to assess the outcome of the
individual tests in addition to the collective outcome of a total process, the rea-
soning would have fallen squarely within the traditional disparate impact em-
phasis on the results of employment practices or policies on a group. Rather
than follow the established argument that section 703(a)(1) deals with process
and section 703(a)(2) deals with results, however, the Court reexamined the lan-
guage of Title VII and stood the traditional distinction on its head.59 The Court
emphasized that section 703(a)(2) was concerned with employment opportuni-
ties, while at the same time pointing out the references in section 703(a)(1) to the
outcome of employment practices.
The manner in which the Court used section 703(a)(2) terminology con-
cerning "limitations," "classifications," and "opportunities" focused on the em-
ployment process, not its result:
Petitioners' examination, which barred promotion and had a dis-
criminatory impact on black employees, clearly falls within the literal
language of § 703(a)(2), as interpreted by Griggs. The statute speaks,
not in terms of jobs and promotions, but in terms of limitations and
classifications that would deprive any individual of employment oppor-
tunities. A disparate-impact claim reflects the language of § 703(a)(2)
and Congress' basic objectives in enacting that statute: "to achieve
equality of employment opportunities and remove barriers that have
operated in the past to favor an identifiable group of white employees
over other employees." 6
The Court found support for this emphasis on the opportunities and barriers
within the employment process in Griggs6 ' and the disparate impact cases that
followed it:
The decisions of this Court following Griggs also support respon-
dents' claim. In considering claims of disparate impact under
§ 703(a)(2) this Court has consistently focused on employment and
promotion requirements that create a discriminatory bar to opportuni-
ties. This Court has never read § 703(a)(2) as requiring the focus to be
placed instead on the overall number of minority or female applicants
actually hired or promoted.
62
58. Teal, 457 U.S. at 451.
59. As noted in Rigler, supra note 52, at 325, "The Teal Court's substantial reliance on the
literal language of section 703(a)(2) marks a significant departure from its previous decisions."
60. Teal, 457 U.S. at 448 (quoting Griggs, 401 U.S. at 429-30).
61. "We found that Congress' primary purpose was the prophylactic one of achieving equality
of employment 'opportunities' and removing 'barriers' to such equality." Id. at 449 (citing Griggs,
401 U.S. at 429-30).
62. Id. at 450. In support of this statement the majority opinion made reference to Dothard, a
case in which the Court had stated that the focus was not on the bottom line of the composition of
the workforce but on the effect of height and weight standards in classifying far more women than
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On the other hand, the Court offered new insight into the relationship be-
tween section 703(a)(1) and disparate impact claims:
In contrast, the language of § 703 (a)(1), . . . if it were the only
protection given to employees and applicants under Title VII, might
support petitioners' exclusive focus on the overall result. The subsec-
tion makes it an unlawful employment practice "to fail or refuse to
hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, condi-
tions or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex or national origin."
'63
It is section 703(a)(1) that identifies the locus of discrimination as the outcome
of an employment practice. Although section 703(a)(2) speaks to the manner in
which employees are treated (unlawful to "limit, segregate, or classify") and the
relation of that treatment to the rest of the employment process ("opportuni-
ties"), section 703(a)(1) addresses the results (failure to hire, "discharge") of
employment practices and policies.
C. Focus on Individuals
The Supreme Court ruled that Teal was governed not only by a concern for
process rather than outcome, but also by a concern for individuals rather than
groups. The majority opinion rejected the argument that the bottom-line out-
come for the group creates an exception-either in the nature of an additional
burden on the plaintiffs or an affirmative defense-because of Title VII's focus
on the individual." 4 Furthermore, this focus on the individual was ascribed spe-
cifically to section 703(a)(2), not just to Title VII as a whole:
Section 703(a)(2) prohibits practices that would deprive or tend to
deprive "any individual of employment opportunities." The principal
focus of the statute is the protection of the individual employee, rather
than the protection of the minority group as a whole. Indeed, the en-
tire statute and its legislative history are replete with references to pro-
tection for the individual employee.
65
This focus on the individual traditionally has been associated with disparate
treatment theory and with cases presented as violations of section 703(a)(1).
66
Moreover, the three cases cited by the Teal majority in support of a focus on the
individual were Furnco,67 Manhart,6s and Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp. ,69 all
men as ineligible for employment. Dothard, 433 U.S. at 329-30 & n. 12. The Teal Court also referred
to Moody:
Similarly, in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody. . . the action was remanded to allow the
employer to attempt to show that the tests he had given to his employees for promotion
were job related. We did not suggest that by promoting a sufficient number of the black
employees who passed the examination, the employer could avoid this burden.
Teal, 457 U.S. at 450.
63. Teal, 457 U.S. at 448 n.9.
64. Id. at 452-53.
65. Id. at 453-54.
66. See supra notes 9-37 and accompanying text.




In his dissenting opinion, Justice Powell called attention to the fact that,
although the Court had been sensitive to the difference between disparate treat-
ment and disparate impact cases, the majority opinion in Teal ignored the dis-
tinction between these two approaches. 70 The Court's decision, Justice Powell
argued, "confuses the distinction-uniformly recognized until today-between
disparate impact and disparate treatment.
'7 1
nying text. The Teal Court referred to Furnco in maintaining that liability exists for specific acts of
discrimination even within a racially balanced work force:
"It is clear beyond cavil that the obligation imposed by Title VII is to provide an equal
opportunity for each applicant regardless of race, without regard to whether members of
the applicant's race are already proportionately represented in the work force. See Griggs
v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. at 430; McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co., 427
U.S. 273, 279 (1976)."
Teal, 457 U.S. at 454-55 (quoting Furnco, 438 U.S. at 579).
68. Los Angeles Dept. of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978). See supra notes 35-
36 and accompanying text. Fairness to women employees as a whole could not justify unfair treat-
ment of an individual employee because the "statute's focus on the individual is unambiguous." Id.
at 708, quoted in Teal, 457 U.S. at 455.
69. 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (per curiam). The Teal Court noted:
Similarly, in Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp.,. . . we recognized that a rule barring em-
ployment of all married women with preschool children, if not a bona fide occupational
qualification under § 703(e), violated Title VII, even though female applicants without pre-
school childeren were hired in sufficient numbers that they constituted 75 to 80 percent of
the persons employed in the position plaintiff sought.
Teal, 457 U.S. at 455.
70. Teal, 457 U.S. at 456 (Powell, J., dissenting).
71. Id. at 462 (Powell, J., dissenting).
Any confusion caused by the failure of the majority to draw a distinct line between the disparate
impact and disparate treatment theories pales in comparison to that caused by the reasoning of the
dissenters. Justice Powell stated that in disparate impact cases "the plaintiff seeks to carry his bur-
den of proof by way of inference," Teal, 457 U.S. at 458 (Powell, J., dissenting), and that "the
employer's presentation of evidence showing that its overall selection procedure does not operate in a
discriminatory fashion certainly dispels any inference of discrimination." Id. at 459 n.3 (Powell, J.,
dissenting). The language of inference, however, is totally inappropriate in the prima faie and de-
fense stages of a disparate impact case. Carrying a burden of proof by way of inference has had a
place in disparate impact cases only at the pretext stage established in Moody, 422 U.S. at 425, and
Dothard, 433 U.S. at 329. Teal never reached this stage because defendants failed to satisfy their
burden of proving job relatedness.
Justice Brennan's opinion properly describes the dissent's decision to draw an inference from
bottom-line results as a confusion of "unlawful discrimination with discriminatory intent." Teal,
457 U.S. at 454. While claiming to maintain the distinction between disparate treatment and dispa-
rate impact theories, Justice Powell introduces a concept from disparate treatment analysis into this
disparate impact case. Inferring discrimination from facts such as those in Teal is a process appro-
priate to disparate treatment cases. In distinguishing the disparate treatment and disparate impact
approaches in International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977), the
Court observed that in disparate treatment cases "[p]roof of discriminatory motive is critical,
although it can in some situations be inferred from the mere fact of differences in treatment." Id. at
335 n.15. In Title VII claims inference has a place only in ascertaining intent, a task taken up in
disparate treatment cases. The facts in Teal do not merely infer a prima facie case for a violation of
Title VII, they establish it.
The argument in the dissent is reminiscent of the Furnco decision in which the Court ruled that
"proof that [an employer's] work force [is] racially balanced or that it contained a disproportionately
high percentage of minority employees is not wholly irrelevant on the issue of intent when that issue
is yet to be decided." Furnco, 438 U.S. at 580. Intent, however, was not an issue in Teal. Teal
follows Griggs not only in that it is a disparate impact case, but also in that both cases contained
evidence of nondiscriminatory intent. This evidence in Teal was the bottom line produced by de-
fendant's actual promotion decisions. In Griggs the defense argued that the company's lack of dis-
criminatory intent was suggested by the company's financing of two-thirds of the cost of high school
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Justice Brennan's response to this charge, a charge also asserted by peti-
tioners, was an admission of the fact with an added comment to the effect that if
departure from previously accepted theoretical constructs is necessary to ad-
dress discriminatory practices, then that is what the Court will do:
Petitioners point out that Furnco, Manhart, and Phillips involved
facially discriminatory policies, while the claim in the instant case is
one of discrimination from a facially neutral policy. The fact remains,
however, that irrespective of the form taken by the discriminatory
practice, an employer's treatment of other members of the plaintiffs'
group can be "of little comfort to the victims of. . . discrimination."
. . . Title VII does not permit the victim of a facially discriminatory
policy to be told that he has not been wronged because other persons of
his or her race or sex were hired. That answer is no more satisfactory
when it is given to victims of a policy that is facially neutral but practi-
cally discriminatory. Every individual employee is protected against
both discriminatory treatment and "practices that are fair in form, but
discriminatory in operation."
'72
Justice Powell's dissent clarified what was at stake in Teal in another way.
He complained that the majority confused the aims of Title VII with the meth-
ods of proof through which those aims had been achieved. He did not take issue
with the statement that the aim of Title VII is to protect individuals rather than
groups, but he objected to a pursuit of those aims through an approach that
departed from established theory:
The Court, disregarding the distinction drawn by our cases, re-
peatedly asserts that Title VII was designed to protect individual, not
group, rights. It emphasizes that some individual blacks were elimi-
nated by the disparate impact of the preliminary test. But this argu-
ment confuses the aim of Title VII with the legal theories through
which its aims were intended to be vindicated. It is true that the aim
of Title VII is to protect individuals, not groups. But in advancing this
commendable objective, Title VII jurisprudence has recognized two
distinct methods of proof.
73
The fallacy in the Court's reasoning, Justice Powell argued, was the confusion of
"the individualistic aim of Title VII with the methods of proof by which Title
training for undereducated employees. Griggs made clear, however, that such evidence was irrele-
vant: "[G]ood intent or absence of discriminatory intent does not redeem employment procedures
or testing mechanisms that operate as 'built-in headwinds' for minority groups and are unrelated to
measuring job capability." Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432.
72. Teal, 457 U.S. at 455-56 (quoting McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 800). To make the circle
complete, the language in Teal subsequently has been appropriated in disparate treatment proceed-
ings. See Bell v. Bolger, 708 F.2d 1312, 1318 (8th Cir. 1983) (citing Teal as supporting: "Merely
because other members of a protected class-in this case, black or older persons-were recom-
mended by the review committee does not demonstrate an absence of discrimination."); Peters v.
Lieuallen, 693 F.2d 966, 970 (9th Cir. 1982) (relying on Teal to conclude that "the fact that a
particular screening device admits some members of a protected class does not demonstrate an ab-
sence of discrimination"); Harrison v. Lewis, 559 F. Supp. 943, 947 (D.D.C. 1983) ("The Supreme
Court has only recently reaffirmed the basic distinction between the issues of 'bottom line' racial
balance in the employer's entire work force and discriminatory treatment of individuals.").
73. Teal, 457 U.S. at 458 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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VII rights may be vindicated." 74
It is difficult to understand the reasoning of the Teal Court in this regard as
being anything other than an assertion that the purpose of Title VII is of more
significance than the theories or methods of proof that had developed in earlier
litigation. Upon encountering a situation in which the aim of Title VII could
not be fulfilled by the continued use of old theories, the Court was willing to
accept an alternative approach to accomplish the purposes of the original
legislation.
D. The Questions That Remain
The focus on opportunities and individuals in Teal raises a number of ques-
tions that must be answered before the case can become meaningful precedent.
The courts of appeals' decisions that have attempted to follow Teal exhibit a
lack of certainty about how to assess both the significance of the distinction
between opportunities and results and the meaning of the emphasis on individu-
als when facially neutral practices and policies are at issue.
Turning to the first distinction, what is the practical consequence of the
emphasis on opportunities and process rather than outcomes in a disparate im-
pact case? In any employment process that contains elements that have not been
validated as job related, an employer's contention that all minorities are given an
opportunity to compete carries little weight if no minorities actually are pro-
moted. Of course, Title VII is not only concerned with opportunities, but also
with "the opportunity to compete equally." 75 Under the disparate impact ap-
proach, the prima facie evidence of equal opportunity has focused on whether
the results were equal. 76 Title VII does not require equal results, but it does
require a demonstration of job relatedness when the results are unequal.
A first step in providing substance to this emphasis on opportunity is to
reject the idea that Teal and Title VII deal only with "pass-fail barriers."' 77 This
issue was addressed directly in Wilmore v. City of Wilmington.78 In Wilmore the
district court acknowledged that the administrative experience obtained through
selective assignment to "administrative jobs" probably helped firefighters obtain
higher scores on a promotional exam. 79 Because the exam was not a "pass-fail
barrier to completion of the selection process," however, the court held that the
assignment of these jobs on the basis of race did not create the kind of barrier to
professional development that violated petitioner's right to equal employment
74. Id. at 459-60 (Powell, J., dissenting).
75. Id. at 451; see Moody, 422 U.S. at 417; McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 801; Griggs, 401
U.S. at 429-30.
76. Belton, supra note 2, at 547-48.
77. A suggestion to limit Teal to this kind of factual situation makes a prima facie case depen-
dent on circumstances in which "one component of the selection process has a disparate impact on a
protected group and constitutes a pass-fail barrier beyond which the failing candidate cannot con-
tinue. . . ." Note, The Bottom Line Concept, supra note 7, at 840.
78. 533 F. Supp. 844 (D. Del. 1982), rev'd, 699 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1983).
79. Id. at 857.
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opportunities under Title VII and Teal.80
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed.8 1 Cit-
ing the emphasis in Teal on "Title VII's focus on equal employment opportuni-
ties," the court stated: "We believe that the exclusion of minority firefighters
from 'administrative jobs' because of their race with consequent detrimental ef-
fect on their promotional test scores is the kind of 'artifical, arbitrary, and un-
necessary employer-created barriers to professional development' the Court
found in Teal to be prohibited by Title VII. ' 82 Wilmore construed Teal as
reaching beyond distinct pass-fail barriers to include any element of a decision
process that adversely affects members of protected groups. This decision ap-
plies the Teal logic to other employment practices that subsequently influence a
candidate's performance in a hiring or promotion process.
Not all lower courts have incorporated this focus on opportunities into
their reasoning. In Costa v. Markey (Costa 11)83 the United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit, sitting en banc, reversed a ruling of a panel of that
court.84 At issue was a requirement that all persons hired as police officers meet
a minimum height requirement of five feet, six inches. Plaintiff was a woman
who was competing for two positions that at the outset of the appointment pro-
cess had been reserved for women. The court concluded that, "[a]lthough the
height requirement would, in other contexts, have a disparate impact on women,
• . . the height requirement could have had no such impact in this case because
only women were in competition for the job."85
The court distinquished Teal in the following way:
In Teal, the employer sought to remedy the effects of a discriminatory
barrier by affirmatively hiring members of the disadvantaged minority
group. In this case, although plaintiff was discriminated against on the
basis of her height, there was never any discrimination of the type for
which Title VII provides a remedy. Because the sexes were not in
80. Id. at 857 n.33.
81. Wilmore v. City of Wilmington, 699 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1983).
82. Id. at 671-72 (quoting Teal, 457 U.S. at 451). A district court in California also brought the
opportunity-result distinction to bear in rejecting a pass-fail restriction on the meaning of Teal:
Supreme Court authority, Teal included, holds that Title VII applies to job "opportu-
nities." Teal, 102 S.Ct., at 2531-32; Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30, 3
F.E.P. Cases 175 (1971); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 10 F.E.P. Cases
1181 (1975); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 15 F.E.P. Cases 10 (1977). Thus, Court
[sic] must apply Title VII to steps in a hiring process if those steps have an impact on an
individual's opportunity to get a job, even if the step is not absolutely determinative. In
this case, although the written test did not completely eliminate any applicant, it could
have had a major impact on an individual's opportunity to be favorably considered for
promotion. Thus, under Teal and its predecessors, the written test must be considered as a
separate part of the hiring process.
Williams v. City of San Francisco, 31 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 885, 887 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
83. 706 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1982) (en bane), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 547 (1983).
84. A panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit originally had reversed
the district court and ruled in favor of defendants. Costa v. Markey (Costa I), 677 F.2d 158 (1st Cir.
1982), cert. dismissed, 103 S. Ct. 2076 (1983). The court granted a rehearing to examine the effect of
the Teal decision on this case. A panel of the court found that Teal mandated a reversal of the prior
opinion, Costa I1, 706 F.2d at 2-10, but the court sitting en bane reversed the panel. Id. at 10-12.
85. Costa II, 706 F.2d at 10.
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competition, the height requirement had no disparate effect on
women.
86
The court's argument rests on the assumption that the reservation of these posi-
tions for women and the fact that two women were hired prohibit the establish-
ment of a prima facie case of disparate impact.
Although it is true that no adverse impact can be shown by the hiring re-
suit, it is obvious that the opportunity for many women to compete for these
positions was frustrated by the barrier of a five-foot-six-inch height requirement.
When the court ruled that "[p]laintiff simply failed to make it over the initial
hurdle of demonstrating that the challenged barrier had a discriminatory effect
on women," 87 the court could only be interpreting "effect" to apply solely to the
results of the decision process, not to the opportunity afforded to participate in
that process.
88
Another decision that does not take into account the Teal Court's distinc-
tion between opportunities and results is Massarsky v. General Motors Corp.89
This case dealt with General Motors' practice of immunizing employees enrolled
as students in the General Motors Institute (GMI) from layoffs, which otherwise
were handled on a seniority basis. Fifth-year GMI students were assigned to the
sponsoring plant on a full-time basis. When it became necessary to furlough
employees, Massarsky, protected under the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967,90 was laid off while students with less seniority were not. The
student-nonstudent division arguably segregated employees along age lines, 91
86. Id. at 11. In Costa I, Judge Coffin, writing the majority opinion, had characterized this case
as a "mirror image" of Teal. Costa v. Markey (Costa I), 677 F.2d 158, 161 n.3 (lst Cir. 1982), cert
dismissed, 103 S. Ct. 2076 (1983). Once the Supreme Court settled the issue in Teal with a result
different from that rendered by the court of appeals, Judge Coffin admitted the confusion caused by
the use of the term "mirror image," stating that the term was intended to highlight "the differences
rather than the similarities between the two cases." Costa II, 706 F.2d at 11 n.1l.
87. Costa II, 706 F.2d at 12.
88. In this case opportunity is not a vague concept to be applied to potential applicants. As the
court acknowledged, but for the height requirement, plaintiff would have been hired as a police
officer. Id.
89. 706 F.2d 111 (3d Cir.), cert denied, 104 S. Ct. 348 (1983). Although Massarsky is an age
discrimination case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit carried out its analysis
within the Title VII disparate impact framework:
Although the Second Circuit has expressly recognized the disparate impact doctrine in the
ADEA context, see Geller v. Markham, 635 F.2d 1027 (2nd Cir. 1980), cert denied, 451
U.S. 945, 101 S.Ct. 2028, 68 L.Ed. 2d 332 (1981), this court has never ruled on whether a
plaintiff can establish violation of the Act by showing disparate impact alone. But even
assuming, without deciding, that the disparate impact theory does apply to age discrimina-
tion suits, the district court correctly ruled that Massarsky is not entitled to any relief.
Id. at 120. Subsequent discussions of age discrimination in Massarsky presume the applicability of
Title VII disparate impact analysis.
90. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1982).
91. There was an evidentiary problem about the composition by age of the student and nonstu-
dent groups. It was established that applicants for GMI "are primarily high school students, and the
typical beginning student is from 18-20 years of age." Massarsky, 706 F.2d at 115 n.4. Although the
dissent claimed that the record in this case supported a finding "that virtually 100% of the protected
class is in the disfavored group because the favored student group is under 40," id. at 130 (Sloviter,
J., dissenting), the majority opinion argued that this assertion was not supported by the record. Id.
at 121. The reasoning of the majority on this point, however, provides further evidence of its failure
to account for the distinction made in Teal between opportunity and result. The majority wrote:
"Even if all laid off employees were older than GMI students who received special treatment, the
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and Massarsky filed suit for age discrimination. In finding for defendant, the
court reasoned:
[T]here was no tangible impact until it actually became necessary
for the company to lay off a process engineer, and it was then-and
only then-that Massarsky was adversely affected. The reason Mas-
sarsky was selected for layoff was that he possessed the least seniority
of all employees eligible for layoff. Thus, unlike Teal, where plaintiff
was affected by the discriminatory practice at the moment she was ex-
cluded from further consideration for promotion, Massarsky was not
adversely affected until his low seniority identified him for layoff when
in-plant force reductions became necessary.
92
The key phrase in this statement is "eligible for layoff." Under the con-
tested policy, a group of younger employees-GMI students-had been declared
ineligible for layoff. This policy seems to have affected significantly Massarsky's
opportunity to avoid furlough. As Judge Sloviter stated in a dissenting opinion,
"Massarsky established a prima facie case of disparate impact by showing that
the policy to retain students, even if not facially discriminatory, in effect pre-
ferred younger employees, and was the reason for his layoff."' 93 By limiting its
consideration to the results of this practice, the majority found otherwise.
Judge Rosenn, writing the majority opinion in Massarsky, followed an at-
tempt made by the Costa I court to distinguish these circumstances from those
in Teal. "Teal stands for the proposition that an employment practice must be
analyzed at 'the first step in the employment process that produces an adverse
impact on a [protected group], not the end result of the employment process as a
whole.'-94 The relevant issue in this analysis is the point at which employees
first were affected by these employment practices. To claim that they were not
affected until these practices resulted in Massarsky's layoff and in Costa's not
being hired is to focus on results rather than opportunities contrary to the focus
explicitly adopted in Teal. Immunizing students from layoff procedures and re-
quiring a minimum height of five feet, six inches, are business practices that
adversely affect the opportunities of older employees and female applicants from
the moment they are established.
95
Clearly, questions remain about how the concept of "opportunities" can be
the focus of a disparate impact inquiry. The Teal Court's emphasis on the indi-
vidual has not been incorporated uniformly into section 703(a)(2) analysis.
Again, the Massarsky opinions sharpen the contested issue. The majority rea-
Act would not be violated unless those age 40 to 70 were disproportionately represented among the
laid off employees." Id. at 121 (emphasis added).
92. Id. at 122.
93. Id. at 131 (Sloviter, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
94. Id. at 122 (quoting Costa v. Markey, 694 F.2d 876, 880 (1st Cir. 1982) (opinion withdrawn
due to granting of rehearing)).
95. In the Costa cases it is somewhat curious that plaintiff was allowed to complete the entire
application process-not once, but twice-when any possibility of her being hired already had been
foreclosed by the height requirement. The reasoning of the Costa II court seems to indicate that the
result in Teal should have been different if the persons failing the exam had not been notified of their
failure until the end of the selection process.
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soned that "[a]n adverse effect on a single employee, or even a few employees, is
not sufficient to establish disparate impact."'96 This language reflects the think-
ing of the Teal dissenting opinion. Justice Powell asserted that "[t]here can be
no violation of Title VII on the basis of disparate impact in the absence of dispa-
rate impact on a group."
'97
Our cases. . . have made clear that discriminatory-impact claims
cannot be based on how an individual is treated in isolation from the
treatment of other members of the group. Such claims necessarily are
based on whether the group fares less well than other groups under a
policy, practice, or test. Indeed, if only one minority member has
taken a test, a disparate-impact claim cannot be made, regardless of
whether the test is an initial step in the selection process or one of
several factors considered by the employer in making an employment
decision.98
Judge Sloviter's dissent in Massarsky issued a strong challenge to this
assumption.
The majority's holding that it was not enough for Massarsky to
prove an impact on Massarsky alone ignores the directly applicable
language in Connecticut v. Teal. . . . There, Justice Brennan, writing
for the Court, rejected the claim that there was no violation of Title
VII because other employees in the protected group were favorably
treated. . . . Justice Brennan made explicit that the focus on the indi-
vidual adversely affected by the employer's policy or action should be
applied in all Title VII cases, whether brought under the discrimina-
tory treatment theory or under the disparate impact theory.99
What meaning could the Teal Court's contention that the principal focus of
section 703(a)(2) is on the individual rather than on the group have, unless
Judge Sloviter is correct? On the other hand, how could disparate impact be
demonstrated if only a single individual was affected adversely by an employ-
ment practice or policy?
In both Costa II and Massarsky the appellate courts rendered split decisions
because a theoretical framework was not available for incorporating the Teal
concepts into the adjudication of claims by individuals that the disparate impact
theory was applicable in their cases. In each case the majority decision ran
counter to the emphasis in Teal on opportunities and individuals because the
appellate courts resorted to the traditional approach to disparate impact theory.
96. Massarsky, 706 F.2d at 121.
97. Teal, 457 U.S. at 459 (Powell, J., dissenting).
98. Id. at 462-63 (Powell, J., dissenting).
99. Massarsky, 706 F.2d at 130 (Sloviter, J., dissenting). The issue of focusing on the individual
rather than the group also is pertinent to the Costa cases. As the majority opinion in Costa II stated,
women, as a group, were not affected adversely by the hiring process, Costa II, 706 F.2d at 3. Two
positions were open and two women were hired. An individual woman, however, was affected ad-
versely by a requirement that does have a disparate impact on women as a group. Id. at 5.
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III. A NEW CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
A. The Proposition
The issue raised in Teal can be addressed only by the formulation of a new
analytic approach. The proposed approach and its reasoning are directed only
at the establishment of a prima facie case in a disparate impact context. At
certain points in this discussion, however, it will be obvious that the door has
been opened for a more sweeping review of employment discrimination
theory. 100
The crux of the problem is the position taken by the majority in Massar-
sky-and arguably implied by Justice Powell's dissent in Teal-that a violation
of Title VII cannot be based on a disparate impact theory when only a single
employee or small group of employees have been adversely affected. °10 The im-
plication of this approach is that the same policy, administered in the same man-
ner, may be discriminatory if six persons are dismissed, but not discriminatory if
only three are terminated. Under this analysis, the reach of Title VII is depen-
dent on factors extrinsic to the employment policies and practices under scru-
tiny. If the economy had been worse and General Motors had laid off ten people
over age forty instead of only one, would Massarsky have prevailed? When the
New Bedford Police Department fills an opening with a male, can Costa again
assert a Title VII claim on the same grounds and win? Exactly how many peo-
ple does it take to make out a disparate impact case?
Even asking these questions seems to violate the Supreme Court's holding
in Teal that the focus of section 703(a)(2) is on the individual. These and other
related concerns can be addressed by application of a two-stage analytic frame-
work in disparate impact cases-a new theoretical approach that will incorpo-
rate the traditional use of statistics in making out a prima facie disparate impact
case, afford an opportunity for a single individual to find protection under sec-
tion 703(a)(2), respond to the objections of Justice Powell in his Teal dissent, at
least in a literal reading of his dissent, and accomplish the purposes of Title VII
more fully than does the traditional framework.
The first stage of the proposed analysis examines employment practices and
policies in light of the Teal Court's identification of policies that are "facially
neutral but practically discriminatory."'10 2 It may be helpful to think of such
policies and practices as "superficially neutral." Although some facially neutral
requirements are revealed as discriminatory only within the confines of a partic-
100. Even before the Teal decision, observers found evidence that the Supreme Court's decisions
represented an evolution toward the merger of the disparate impact and disparate treatment ap-
proaches. See, eg., Furnish, A Path through the Maze: Disparate Impact and Disparate Treatment
Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 After Beazer and Burdine, 23 B.C.L. RaV. 419, 440-
45 (1982). The Teal Court's use of the concepts of individuals, groups, opportunities, and results in
relation to § 703(a)(1) and § 703(a)(2) can only increase speculation in this area.
101. See Teal, 457 U.S. at 459, 462-63 (Powell, J., dissenting); Massarsky, 706 F.2d at 121. The
literal wording of Powell's dissent does not necessarily lead to the conclusions drawn by the Massar-
sky court. See infra notes 144-47 and accompanying text. As noted previously, this issue also is
pertinent to the Costa II decision. See supra text accompanying note 87.
102. Teal, 457 U.S. at 455.
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ular work setting, others almost always have an adverse impact on members of
protected groups. A category of policies and requirements that are not only
facially but also superficially neutral should be created to enhance the identifica-
tion of discriminatory employment practices. The inclusion of employment
practices and policies in this category should be based on the disparate impact
that they have on groups as a whole-not necessarily the impact on a particular
group of employees or applicants. The utilization of practices and policies that
fall within this category creates a presumption of discriminatory behavior. Be-
cause the test of whether a criterion is superficially neutral is based on its effect
on an entire group, rather than the individuals in a specified work place, the
scope of this category would become fairly stable over time. Prime candidates
for such categorization would include height and weight requirements, tests on
which members of protected groups historically have a poor performance rec-
ord, status as a student, education requirements, and matters associated with
family background. In each of these instances the classifications and criteria
usually have an adverse impact on women, minority groups, or older persons.
This categorization in effect renders suspect the classification of such tests
and requirements as facially neutral. Their relationship to the general popula-
tion demonstrates that they are only superficially neutral. Following the lan-
guage of section 703(a)(2), the superficially neutral policies and practices would
be those that tend to deprive individual members of protected groups of employ-
ment opportunities.
The second stage of the analysis focuses on any individual who claims that
she has been affected adversely by the use of such policies, practices, or tests. At
this stage, unlike the first step, impact on a single individual should be the focus
of inquiry.10 3 This analysis, of course, takes place as the plaintiff is attempting
to establish a prima facie case. The employer's use of requirements that are
directly linked to race, sex, or age is not necessarily prohibited. Their utiliza-
tion, however, places the burden of job relatedness on the employer even in cir-
cumstances in which only one member of a protected group is affected. Through
this approach, the traditional view that disparate impact is understandable only
in relation to groups and the Teal emphasis that disparate impact analysis
should focus on individuals both can be accommodated.
B. Statistics in a Disparate Impact Case
One possible objection to the proposed analysis is that the method used to
demonstrate disparate impact violates the theoretical approach that has been
established in the courts. 1' 4 On the contrary, however, this conceptual frame-
work is theoretically at one with the Supreme Court's reasoning that has sup-
ported the use of statistical evidence in disparate impact cases and actually is
103. "It is not sufficient for an individual plaintiff to show that the employer followed a discrimi-
natory policy without also showing that plaintiff himself was injured." Coe v. Yellow Freight Sys.,
Inc., 646 F.2d 444, 451 (10th Cir. 1981).
104. See, eg., New York Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 585-86 (1979) (actual applicant
pool provides basis for comparison); Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 308
(1977) (standard for testing impact is relevant labor market).
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foreshadowed in these prominent decisions.105
Use of general population statistics in a particular case must be examined.
Is it appropriate to apply such undifferentiated statistics to develop a category of
superfically neutral employment practices before the facts of a particular case
have been established? There is a thread of precedent that appears to support an
objection to this general use of undifferentiated statistics.
In Hazelwood School District v. United States106 the Supreme Court took
care to sort out which statistical comparisons were appropriate and which were
not. The Court ruled that a comparison of the composition of a school district's
teacher work force to its student population was not appropriate,1" 7 but a com-
parison between that work force and the qualified public school teacher popula-
tion in the relevant labor market was proper.108 The Court's decision also left to
the district court, on remand, the determination whether proof could be adduced
from the comparison of the composition of the work force with that of those
persons who actually had applied for teaching positions-a comparison the
Court indicated would be "very relevant."1" 9
Similarly, in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody the Court concluded that the
burden on defendant to demonstrate a test's relationship to employment arises
"only after the complaining party or class had made out a prima facie case of
discrimination, i.e., has shown that the tests in question select applicants for hire
or promotion in a racial pattern significantly different from the pool of appli-
cants." 11" A focus on the actual applicant pool when evaluating work force
statistics also appeared in New York Transit Authority v. Beazer.111 When faced
with an employment practice that excluded methadone users and with statistics
about the racial composition of methadone users in public methadone programs
in New York City, the Court was not impressed: "We do not know, however,
how many of these persons ever worked or sought to work with TA [New York
Transit Authority]. This statistic therefore reveals little if anything about the
racial composition of the class of TA job applicants and employees receiving
methadone treatment." 11
2
This reasoning, however, cannot sustain a challenge to the proposed crea-
tion of a category of superficially neutral practices. The mainstream of prece-
dent, including the cases just cited, has held that statistical evidence of
discriminatory impact need not be confined to the specific employment situation
at hand. This broader view of the use of statistics in disparate impact cases is set
forth clearly and unmistakably in Dothard v. Rawlinson:
113
105. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977); International Brotherhood of Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
106. 433 U.S. 299 (1977).
107. Id. at 308.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 308 n.13.
110. 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975).
111. 440 U.S. 568 (1979).
112. Id. at 585.
113. 433 U.S. 321 (1977)
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The appellants argue that a showing of disproportionate impact on wo-
men based on generalized national statistics should not suffice to estab-
lish a prima facie case. They point in particular to Rawlinson's failure
to adduce comparative statistics concerning actual applicants for cor-
rectional counselor positions in Alabama. There is no requirement,
however, that a statistical showing of disproportionate impact must
always be based on analysis of the characteristics of actual appli-
cants. . . . The application process itself might not adequately reflect
the actual potential applicant pool, since otherwise qualified people
might be discouraged from applying because of a self-recognized in-
ability to meet the very standards challenged as being discrimina-
tory. . . . A potential applicant could easily determine her height and
weight and conclude that to make an application would be futile.
Moreover, reliance on general population demographic data was not
misplaced where there was no reason to suppose that physical height
and weight characteristics of Alabama men and women differ mark-
edly from those of the national population.'
1 4
Reliance on general population statistics was judged to be appropriate in
Dothard if there was no reason to believe that more refined statistics would differ
markedly.11 5 The undifferentiated statistics were viewed as preferable to "actual
applicant" numbers because of the way the challenged employment standard
might have skewed the application process.
11 6
The same theme is contained in the Court's decision in Teamsters. The
Court rejected defendant's contention that statistics comparing an employer's
work force with the population at large should not be given decisive weight in a
Title VII case.
117
The argument fails in this case because the statistical evidence was not
offered or used to support an erroneous theory that Title VII requires
an employer's work force to be racially balanced. Statistics showing
racial or ethnic imbalance are probative in a case such as this one only
because such imbalance is often a telltale sign of purposeful discrimina-
tion; absent explanation, it is ordinarily to be expected that nondis-
criminatory hiring practices will in time result in a work force more or
less representative of the racial and ethnic composition of the popula-
tion in the community from which employees are hired. . .. Consid-
erations such as small sample size may, of course, detract from the
value of such evidence,. . . and evidence showing that the figures for
the general population might not accurately reflect the pool of qualified
job applicants would also be relevant.1 1 8
Neither the Teamsters decision nor that in Dothard gives a blanket endorse-
ment of the use of general population statistics. Such statistics, however, are
judged to be appropriate "absent explanation" unless there is evidence showing
114. Id. at 330.
115. Id. at 331.
116. Id. at 330.
117. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 339-40 n.20.
118. Id.
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that the pool of qualified applicants has a different composition'" 9 or unless
there is reason to suppose that more refined statistics would produce different
results. 120 In a Title VII context, when looking at the impact of an employment
practice, what kind of explanation or reason justifies the use of only differenti-
ated statistics? A closer look at Hazelwood and Beazer indicates the Court's
answer to this crucial question.
Just as Teamsters and Dothard do not endorse the universal use of genera-
lized statistics, neither do Hazelwood and Beazer call for a consistent rejection of
them. The Hazelwood Court distinguished its ruling on general population sta-
tistics from that in Teamsters by focusing on the nature of the jobs in question.
In Teamsters the job skill required (driving a truck) was a skill that many people
possessed or could easily acquire. Thus, the use of areawide population figures
was appropriate.1 2 1 Reliance on a similar statistical base in Hazelwood, how-
ever, was not proper because it failed to take into account the special qualifica-
tions for the position in question. "When special qualifications are required to
fill particular jobs, comparisons to the general population (rather than to the
smaller group of individuals who possess the necessary qualifications) may have
little probative value."'
122
The majority opinion in Beazer explicitly followed the rulings in both
Dothard and Teamsters. "Although 'a statistical showing of disproportionate
impact need not always be based on an analysis of the characteristics of actual
applicants,' . . . 'evidence showing that the figures for the general population
might not accurately reflect the pool of qualified job applicants' undermines the
significance of such figures." 123 Citing several problems with the figures that
plaintiff presented, the Court ruled that the statistical showing was at best weak,
119. Id. at 339-40. The Teamsters Court, however, did articulate the point, picked up in the
Dothard decision, that the pool of actual applicants may not adequately reflect the composition of
the group affected by a discriminatory practice. "When a person's desire for a job is not translated
into a formal application solely because of his unwillingness to engage in a futile gesture he is as
much a victim of discrimination as is he who goes through the motions of submitting an applica-
tion." Id. at 365-66.
120. General state-wide population statistics also were found to be relevant in Griggs. Griggs,
401 U.S. at 430 n.6. In that same footnote, the Griggs Court also pointed to pass-fail statistics for the
specific tests at issue. In Green v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 523 F.2d 1290 (8th Cir. 1975), the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit demonstrated the flexibility with which statistics can
be used to establish a disparate impact prima facie case.
A disproportionate racial impact may be established statistically in any of three ways. The
first procedure considers whether blacks as a class (or at least blacks in a specified geo-
graphical area) are excluded by the employment practice in question at a substantially
higher rate than whites ....
The second procedure focuses on a comparison of the percentage of black and white
job applicants actually excluded by the employment practice or test of the particular com-
pany or governmental agency in question ....
Finally, a third procedure examines the level of employment of blacks by the company
or governmental agency in comparison to the percentage of blacks in the relevant geo-
graphical area.
Id. at 1293-94.
121. Hazelwood, 433 U.S. at 308 n.13.
122. Id.




and even if capable of establishing a prima facie case, it was rebutted by a dem-
onstration that the requirement was job related.
1 24
It still remains to be determined whether it is appropriate to apply undiffer-
entiated statistics to develop a category of superficially neutral employment
practices prior to reviewing the facts of a particular case. The logic of the
Supreme Court's decisions suggests an atfirmative answer. General population
statistics can be used properly unless there is evidence showing that they should
not be so used. 125 Reliance on undifferentiated demographic data is not mis-
placed when no reason is given to the contrary. 12 6 Information about special job
skills or about the composition of a specific application pool eventually may
negate any probative force a superficially neutral requirement may have in a
particular case. The burden, however, should be on those who wish to rebut the
showing made by such undifferentiated data. Absent explanation, the composi-
tion of the population at large is an appropriate yardstick by which to measure
the impact on employment practices and policies.
127
C. A "Superficially Neutral" Classification and the Purposes of Title VII
The establishment of a category of superficially neutral employment policies
and practices would enhance the achievement of the purposes of Title VII. At
one level, this claim is easily supported by simple reference to the language of
the statute.128 Business standards that would be prime candidates for classifica-
tion as superficially neutral are precisely those requirements that tend to limit or
classify individuals because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Moreover, the statistical method that would link superficially neutral policies to
section 703(a)(2) has a long and established place in disparate impact analysis; it
regularly has been applied to the traditional category of facially neutral
requirements.
More specific evidence of the compatibility of this proposal with congres-
124. Beazer, 440 U.S. at 584-87. Opinions may vary about the strength of the statistical evidence
presented and the manner in which precedent was applied to the facts of this case. The Court,
however, construed its findings to be consistent with the Dothard-Teamsters treatment of statistical
evidence. Id. at 586 n.29.
125. See supra text accompanying notes 117-18.
126. See supra text accompanying notes 113-16.
127. The presumptive validity of general population figures suggested in this Article also was
advocated by one commentator as an approach to specific cases following Hazelwood. See Shoben,
Probing the Discriminatory Effects of Employee Selection Procedures with Disparate Impact Analysis
Under Title VII, 56 TEx. L. REv. 1, 19 (1977) ("Plaintiff's prima facie case is established by the
basic comparison of defendant's work force with the general population. It should then be defend-
ant's task to rebut the inference of discrimination by showing that the proper comparison is with a
particular segment of the population."). For a contrary view, see Lerner, Employment Discrimina-
tion: Adverse Impact, Validity and Equality, 1979 Sup. Cr. REv. 17; see also Lamber, Reskin, &
Dworkin, The Relevance of Statistics to Prove Discrimination: A Typology, 34 HAsTINGs L.J. 553,
585-95 (1983) ("appropriate comparison population" is a disputed issue); Maltz, The Expansion of
the Role of the Effects Test in Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Analysis, 59 NEB. L. REv. 345,
347-48 (1980) ("statistics on the general population should not inevitably be considered definitive for
purposes of Title VII litigation").
128. It is unlawful under § 703(a)(2) for an employer "to limit, segregate, or classify his employ-
ees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual
of employment opportunities .... " 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (1982).
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sional intent can be found in the legislative response to the use of one particular
superficially neutral category: pregnancy. In General Electric Co. v. Gilbert129
the Supreme Court, in essence, held that pregnancy was a facially neutral cate-
gory. Specifically, the majority determined that denying coverage in an em-
ployer's insurance program for disabilities arising from pregnancy did not
violate section 703(a)(1) because "an exclusion of pregnancy from a disability-
benefits plan providing general coverage is not a gender-based discrimination at
all."
130
This treatment of pregnancy as a facially neutral classification was con-
firmed by the Court the next year in Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty:131 "Petitioner's
decision not to treat pregnancy as a disease or disability for purposes of seniority
retention is not on its face a discriminatory policy.' 1 32 Accordingly, the exclu-
sion of pregnancy from disability coverage again was ruled not to be a violation
of section 703(a)(1). The Satty Court, however, did find a disparate impact re-
sulting from the employer's policy that denied accumulated seniority to female
employees returning from pregnancy leave. This finding was sufficient to estab-
lish a prima facie case under section 703(a)(2).133
What would the results in Satty have been if only one pregnant employee
had been involved? Could the disparate impact case have been established if
only one employee actually had been affected adversely by the policy? Congress
did not wait for the Court to answer these questions. The 1978 amendments to
Title VII overruled the Satty decision. Section 701(4) now provides:
The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" include, but are
not limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth or
related medical conditions; and women affected by pregnancy, child-
birth or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all
employment-related purposes, including receipt of benefits under
fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but similar in
their ability or inability to work .... 134
Although pregnancy technically is a facially neutral classification, Congress rec-
ognized that it is only transparently so and included it in the language of Title
VII. The proposal in this Article, incorporating the superficially neutral cate-
gory into Title VII jurisprudence, simply involves the identification of similarly
transparent facially neutral employment practices and policies.
Our judicial system has recognized the need for wide-ranging inquiries into
the purposes of Title VII. When confronted with the dual reality that few em-
ployers openly express their discriminatory intentions and that much discrimi-
nation takes institutionalized forms, the courts have accepted other indicators,
pointers, and signs of discriminatory employment practices. For example, the
use of statistics has become routine in Title VII cases not because the law man-
129. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
130. Id. at 136 (making reference to the ruling in Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974)).
131. 434 U.S. 136 (1977).
132. Id. at 140.
133. Id. at 141-42.
134. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982).
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dates proportional outcomes 135 but because of what disproportionate outcomes
tell us about discriminatory behavior. A statistical imbalance "is often a telltale
sign" of purposeful discrimination. 136 Similarly, nonobjective hiring standards
are "always suspect" because of their capacity for masking bias. 137 A lack of
objective guidelines and the failure to post notices of job vacancies have been
called "badges of discrimination."
138
One more "sign" of discriminatory practice-a "badge of discrimina-
tion"-should be recognized. The use of a superficially neutral standard that
adversely affected an individual member of a protected group should prompt an
inquiry. The following questions would be asked: Are there reasons why undif-
ferentiated statistics are not appropriate in this specific case? Is there a job-
related reason for using this standard, even though it is only superficially neu-
tral? If affirmative answers could not be given to either question, then a pre-
sumption of discrimination would exist similar to that recognized in Furnco
Construction Corp. v. Waters:139 "[When all legitimate reasons for rejecting an
applicant have been eliminated as possible reasons for the employer's actions, it
is more likely than not [that] the employer, whom we generally assume acts only
with some reason, based his decision on an impermissible consideration such as
race.,,14 o
The Court repeatedly has asserted that "Congress' primary purpose [in en-
acting Title VII] was the prophylactic one of achieving equality of employment
'opportunities' and removing 'barriers' to such equality." 14 1 The proposed
framework fits firmly within these stated purposes of Title VII. The language of
the statute, the congressional response to the Court's handling of the transpar-
ently neutral classification of pregnancy, and the utilization of other devices to
provide evidence of discrimination all provide firm support for the creation and
application of a category of "superficially neutral" employment practices within
the theoretical framework that has been suggested.
135. Title VII forbids requiring employers to grant preferential treatment to assure proportion-
ate results.
Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be interpreted to require any employer, employ-
ment agency, labor organization, or joint labor-management committee subject to this sub-
chapter to grant preferential treatment to any individual or to any group because of the
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin of such individual or group on account of an
imbalance which may exist with respect to the total number or percentage of persons of
any race, color, religion, sex or national origin employed by any employer ....
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1982).
136. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 340 n.20. In a Griggs-type case, however, intent is not necessary to
find unlawful discrimination.
137. Barnett v. W.T. Grant Co., 518 F.2d 543, 550 (4th Cir. 1975).
138. Brown v. Gaston County Dyeing Mach. Co., 457 F.2d 1377, 1383 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 982 (1972).
139. 438 U.S. 567 (1978).
140. Id. at 577.
141. Teal, 457 U.S. at 449; see also Moody, 422 U.S. at 417 (aim of Title VII was to "'achieve
equality of employment opportunities and remove barriers that have operated in the past'" (quoting
Griggs, 401 U.S. at 429-30)).
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D. Teal Revisited
The Teal decision has been identified as the impetus for developing this
two-stage analytic framework for use in disparate impact cases. A review of that
ruling, measuring the adequacy of this proposal by the decision that produced it,
demonstrates that the revised theory not only serves the needs revealed in the
majority opinion, but also responds to the major objections expressed in the dis-
sent. The task at hand following Teal is to find a way to incorporate the Court's
emphasis on employment opportunitites and on the individual into disparate im-
pact analysis. Although traditional disparate impact theory had relied on the
results of employment practices for groups, the Court clearly interpreted section
703(a)(2) as including--even focusing on-the effect of such practices on em-
ployment opportunities for individuals. In this two-step procedure, the first step
addresses the concern for opportunities and the second singles out the
individual.
The majority opinion in Teal stressed the fact that Title VII guarantees all
persons "the opportunity to compete equally. . . on the basis of job-related cri-
teria." 142 Equal opportunity is possible only when artificial, arbitrary, and un-
necessary barriers that have a discriminatory impact have been removed. The
Court also stated that determining which barriers produce an adverse impact is
not dependent on the ultimate results that those barriers yield in an employment
process.
The first part of the proposed analysis-the identification of certain employ-
ment practices and policies that generally discriminate against members of a
protected group-follows precisely the Court's expressed intent. These superfi-
cially neutral requirements are those barriers that are artificial, arbitrary, and
unnecessary, unless they are shown to be job related. They are barriers that
have a disparate impact at the opportunity stage on those persons whom Title
VII was designed to protect.
As the Supreme Court found in Dothard, it makes sense to try to measure
opportunity by use of undifferentiated statistics because the mere existence of the
standards being challenged may skew the composition of actual applicant
pools.143 The purpose is to ascertain the impact certain policies and practices
have on employment opportunity, not to describe the results that flow from their
use. Unless reasons can be given why reliance on general population statistics is
misguided in a particular case, the comparative opportunities for men and wo-
men to enter into competition for a job or promotion is reflected by this kind of
statistical analysis.
Whereas the first step of the proposed analysis responds to the Teal focus
on opportunity, the second stage incorporates the Court's concern for the indi-
vidual. Following this theoretical framework, a prima facie case is established
when an individual is disadvantaged by the use of a superficially neutral crite-
142. Teal, 457 U.S. at 451. As Griggs states, standards should "measure the person for the job
and not the person in the abstract." Griggs, 401 U.S. at 436.
143. Dothard, 433 U.S. at 330.
[Vol. 63
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
rion. It is not sufficient to prove that an employer used a standard that is gener-
ally discriminatory for the population at large. A plaintiff also must
demonstrate that she has been affected while attempting to pursue an employ-
ment opportunity. Through such a process, the emphasis in the Teal decision on
both opportunity and the individual is accommodated.
This framework also addresses major objections raised by Justice Powell in
his dissent-at least on their face. Justice Powell argued that "[t]here can be no
violation of Title VII on the basis of disparate impact in the absence of disparate
impact on a group."144 He noted that "discriminatory-impact claims cannot be
based on how an individual is treated in isolation from the treatment of other
members of the group." 145 These statements, in themselves, are accurate. The
first stage of the proposed analysis applies this reasoning to an individual's op-
portunity to compete. Disparate impact on a group is precisely what the cate-
gory of superficially neutral standards is intended to encompass. This category
places the individual into the context of the broader group.
Justice Powell could not bring himself to agree with the majority's focus on
the individual in a disparate impact context: "Indeed, if only one minority
member has taken a test, a disparate-impact claim cannot be made .... "146
Citing cases in which courts have ruled that the value of statistics varies with the
sample size, he concluded that "[a] sample of only one would have far too little
probative value to establish a prima facie case of disparate impact." 147 The sta-
tistical determination that a test is superficially neutral, however, is based on a
very large sample. Powell's statement that a disparate impact claim cannot be
made when only one person takes a test illustrates the alternative to the analytic
framework proposed here: the use of a particular test on which minorities
achieve demonstrably lower results than whites is ruled discriminatory in one
setting but not in another simply because one employer has more persons in a
position to take the test than another employer. Title VII, however, was not
intended to offer protection to employers on the ground that they have mini-
mized the number of minority candidates competing in an employment process.
The application of the superficially neutral criterion to employment policies
and practices and the examination of the impact of those standards on particular
individuals provides a mechanism for considering Justice Powell's concerns with
sample size and group results, while not losing sight of the majority's emphasis
on the opportunity each individual is afforded in the employment setting.
IV. CONCLUSION
The lesson from Connecticut v. Teal1 48 is the same as that put forward so
clearly in Griggs: If an employer is using a test, selection device, or other em-
ployment standard that has an adverse impact on a protected group, it should
144. Teal, 457 U.S. at 459 (Powell, J., dissenting).
145. Id. at 462 (Powell, J., dissenting).
146. Id. at 462-63 (Powell, J., dissenting).
147. Id. at 463 n.7 (Powell, J., dissenting).
148. 457 U.S. 440 (1982).
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either validate that test as job related or cease using it. Interpreted in this light,
the Teal decision simply reaffirms the most established principle in employment
discrimination law.
The majority in Teal advanced a second working hypothesis. If the analytic
methods that have been used in the past to evaluate employment practices and
policies do not fit a new fact situation, the Court will not be bound by them. The
purposes of Title VII-to achieve equality of employment opportunity and to
remove barriers to such equality-take precedence over the specific devices that
have been used in the service of that purpose. The Court moved beyond the neat
division that had arisen through the adjudication of earlier cases-that one the-
ory addresses only individuals and process and that another concerns itself only
with groups and results-when it became clear that such a division frustrates
rather than promotes the purposes of Title VII.
The Teal Court, however, did not sweep away a decade of precedent.
Rather, its focus on the individual and on employment opportunity in a dispa-
rate impact case adds to the established "rules" for identifying Title VII viola-
tions. The Costa 11 and Massarsky cases illustrate the types of cases that can slip
through the gap between the traditional approaches of disparate impact and dis-
parate treatment. These decisions also are evidence that, while the Teal Court
provided the directive to close this gap, there is a need for a conceptual frame-
work to guide lower courts as they attempt to incorporate the Teal holding into
their future deliberations.
Such a framework has been developed in this Article. The proposed two-
stage analysis, making use of the category of superficially neutral classifications,
is designed to promote enforcement of the Teal mandate. Building on estab-
lished precedent, this approach guarantees that any individual who is unfairly
denied an employment opportunity will not be without recourse simply because
the facts of her case do not follow the guidelines in the traditional theories of
discrimination.
The intent in proposing this approach is to follow the Teal Court in pro-
moting a basic premise: When a plaintiff is denied relief, that denial should be
based on a finding that the employment practice in question does not violate the
purposes of Title VII, rather than on a finding that the facts of a particular case
do not conform to those cases that have shaped the existing framework for ana-
lyzing the problem. As new fact situations present themselves, the courts have
three options: construe all of them as fitting within the contours of those cases
that shaped existing theories; recognize the uniqueness of new circumstances
and address them outside the articulated conceptual framework; or modify es-
tablished analytic procedures or develop new ones. The first option entails an
unwarranted assumption that the facts of the first cases adjudicated under a
statute will define the statute's reach. The second option poses obvious problems
for judicial consistency. This Article has chosen to pursue the third option. The
Court's argument in Teal makes it difficult to see how the choice could be
otherwise.
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